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                                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL   
     
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 08-1320 
______ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 
   v. 
 
LARRY DAVIS, 
               Appellant 
______ 
         
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 04-00680-09) 
District Judge: Honorable Jan E. DuBois 
______ 
        
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 24, 2011 
 
Before: BARRY, AMBRO, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 13, 2011) 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 A jury convicted Larry Davis guilty of conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms 
of cocaine and substantive cocaine distribution offenses.  Davis argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove the conspiracy charge and that the District Court improperly admitted 
evidence at trial.  For the reasons which follow, we will affirm. 
I. 
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On April 13, 2005, a Grand Jury returned a Fifty-Three Count Superseding Indictment 
against Davis and eight other co-defendants.
1
  Count One charged all defendants with conspiracy 
to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine in Philadelphia and Delaware Counties from 
July 2003 through October 2004, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).  
Additionally, Davis was charged with distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and distribution of cocaine within 1,000 of a school in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) and 860(a). 
 The Superseding Indictment alleged a large-scale cocaine distribution conspiracy.  At the 
top of the conspiracy was defendant Tyrone Smith, who obtained large quantities of cocaine and 
distributed it to defendant William Green, who in turn redistributed it to defendant Louis Stillis.  
Stillis then distributed the cocaine to street-level cocaine sellers like Davis.  Davis and his co-
conspirators then sold then cocaine to street-level buyers in the Toby Farms neighborhood of 
Delaware County, Pennsylvania.   
 Davis and three co-defendants went to trial on January 3, 2007.  At the close of the 
Government‟s case, Davis moved for judgment of acquittal, but the District Court denied the 
motion.  The jury convicted Davis on all counts.  On January 23, 2008, the District Court 
sentenced Davis to 120 months‟ imprisonment.  Davis timely appealed.2    
II. 
 On appeal, Davis argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to prove his membership 
in the conspiracy; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to prove he conspired to distribute five or 
                                              
1
 Five co-defendants pled guilty.  Davis and three co-defendants – Louis Stillis, Tyrone 
Trader, and Jamal Rideout – were convicted at trial.  
 
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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more kilograms of cocaine; and (3) that the District Court abused its discretion by admitting 
certain evidence.  We reject Davis‟ arguments. 
A. 
 Davis first challenges his conspiracy conviction, arguing that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove his membership in the conspiracy.  When reviewing a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e must sustain the verdict if, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Rawlins, 606 F.3d 73, 80 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (quotations and citation omitted). 
 “The elements of a charge of conspiracy are: (1) „a unity of purpose between the alleged 
conspirators;‟ (2) „an intent to achieve a common goal;‟ and (3) „an agreement to work together 
toward that goal.‟”  United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting United 
States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)).  “A conspiratorial agreement can be proved 
circumstantially based upon reasonable inferences drawn from actions and statements of the 
conspirators . . . .”  United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 238 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 The evidence was sufficient to prove Davis participated in the conspiracy as a street-level 
drug dealer.  Kenneth Wilson, a co-defendant who pled guilty, testified at trial that he delivered 
cocaine from Stillis to Davis.  Supp. App. 307.  Davis then repeatedly sold cocaine to street-level 
customers who also purchased cocaine from other members of the conspiracy.  Additionally, the 
conspirators worked together to evade detection.  On one occasion, Stillis called Davis and told 
Davis to “shut it down” because police had arrested some other individuals.  Id. at 1157.  When 
Davis asked who had been arrested, Stillis replied, “They didn‟t get nobody on our squad[,] 
man.”  Id.  The jury could have inferred a conspiratorial agreement between Stillis and Davis 
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from Stillis‟ reference to “our squad.”  This conversation demonstrates “mutual trust,” a factor 
indicative of a conspiracy.  Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199.  Finally, wiretapped phone conversations 
showed an “established method of payment.”  Id.  Davis gave proceeds of his drug sales to 
Stillis, Supp. App. 1138, Stillis imposed a sales quota on Davis, id. at 1152, and Stillis collected 
money from Davis, id. at 1156.  The jury could reasonably infer a buyer-seller relationship from 
these conversations, and we have found the existence of a conspiracy in less obvious 
circumstances.  See United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2008) (buyer-seller 
conspiracy existed where buyer only bought drugs from a seller “once or twice” and where the 
seller fronted drugs to the buyer and awaited payment until after sales).  Accordingly, the 
evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to infer Davis‟ membership in the conspiracy. 
B. 
 Davis next argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove he conspired to distribute 
five or more kilograms of cocaine.  The jury found as much in response to the District Court‟s 
interrogatory.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we think a 
rational juror could have found Davis guilty.  Multiple street-level buyers testified they bought 
cocaine from Davis, and William Green, a co-defendant, supplied both Stillis and Davis with 
cocaine.   
Moreover, Davis was liable for all reasonably foreseeable criminal offenses committed 
by his co-conspirators during the course of, and in furtherance of, the drug conspiracy.  See 
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946).  Considering Davis‟ conspiratorial 
relationship with Stillis, it was reasonably foreseeable to Davis that the conspiracy involved 
more than five kilograms of cocaine.  Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to prove Davis 
conspired to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine.     
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C. 
 Last, Davis argues that the District Court abused its discretion by admitting evidence 
seized from Tyrone Smith‟s residence, including kilogram wrappers, a money counter, drug 
scales, and other paraphernalia.  During opening arguments, the Government stated that Smith 
was the conspiracy‟s supplier.  Over Davis‟ objection, the District Court permitted Pennsylvania 
State Trooper Michael Skahill to testify about the evidence from Smith‟s residence.  Davis 
contends the evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.  The Government responds that the 
District Court properly admitted the evidence to corroborate Green‟s testimony that Smith 
supplied him with large quantities of cocaine.  We agree with the Government.  
We review the District Court‟s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 497 (3d Cir. 2006).  First, the evidence obtained from Smith‟s 
residence was relevant.  “„Relevant evidence‟ means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable . . . .”  Federal Rule of Evidence 401.  This threshold is “not high.”  United States 
v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotations and citation omitted).  Here, the evidence 
from Smith‟s residence was relevant to the Government‟s alleged chain of distribution and 
tended to make the existence of the conspiracy more probable. 
Nor did the evidence unfairly prejudice Davis.  “Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . 
.”  Federal Rule of Evidence 403.  As we stated in United States v. Starnes, “[T]he prejudice 
against which [Rule 403] guards is unfair prejudice – prejudice of the sort which clouds 
impartial scrutiny and reasoned evaluation of the facts, which inhibits neutral application of 
principles of law to the facts as found.”  583 F.3d 196, 215 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotations and 
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citations omitted).  The evidence seized from Smith‟s residence was admitted for the limited 
purpose of proving the conspiracy‟s chain of distribution.  The Government then presented 
extensive direct evidence of Davis‟ culpability, including testimony from a co-conspirator who 
delivered cocaine to Davis, testimony from street-level buyers who purchased cocaine from 
Davis, and wiretap conversations showing Davis‟ conspiratorial relationship with Stillis.  
Considering this direct evidence of Davis‟ role in the conspiracy, the limited evidence seized 
from Smith‟s residence did not unfairly prejudice Davis.  The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion.     
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the District Court properly denied Davis‟ motion for judgment 
of acquittal on Count One and for a new trial on all counts.  Accordingly, we will affirm Davis‟ 
conviction and sentence.  
